Dissertation

My dissertation, Contested Collection: Technology, Intelligence, and Stability in Great Power Rivalries, asks whether intelligence collection can help stabilize rivalry, or if it sharpens the risk of crises? I argue that the answer lies in the kind of information collected:

• Leverage-providing intelligence, such as time-sensitive targeting data or industrial secrets can destabilize by creating first-strike incentives and shifts in the balance of power.
• Capability-clarifying intelligence can provide insights into an adversary’s military capabilities without generating exploitable vulnerabilities. As a consequence, it can stabilize rivalry by reducing uncertainty and enabling arms control.
• Intrusive collection, however, complicates both dynamics. It can provoke incidents that undercut the stabilizing value of capability-clarifying intelligence. Intrusive collection can also heighten the dangers of leverage-providing intelligence but may reduce them if collecting states refrain from authorizing it to avoid provocations.

To test these claims, I combine Cold War case studies (including U.S. aerial, satellite, and undersea intelligence operations), analysis of contemporary cyber and space espionage, and experimental wargames with elite participants. Together, the project provides policymakers with a framework for designing intelligence strategies that secure information advantages while minimizing escalation risks.

Other Research

Beyond the dissertation, my work explores the intersection of nuclear strategy, intelligence, and emerging technologies. Current projects include:

• “Dependent Deterrents? Nuclear Assistance in Alliances After Proliferation”
• “Perilous Proliferation: Nuclear ‘Hiders’ and the Danger of Preventive Attacks”